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ANDRÁS JAKAB
The use of arguments from comparative law are a popular topic in constitutional scholarship 
nowadays.1 Besides the fact that their study can give an international reputation to their 
authors, they are actually also highly interesting and, at occasions, very complicated, even 
if not a really new phenomenon.
We know much about pros and contras in the debate about the use of arguments from 
comparative law (especially concerning methodology or legitimacy), and we also know 
quite a few examples where they were actually used. So we mostly have a settled opinion 
what courts should do, but we did not have exact data (only examples which served as 
anecdotal evidence) what they were actually doing. The volume of Groppi and Ponthoreau 
fi lls fi nally this research gap by delivering an empirical analysis on the topic. Sixteen 
country reports from all around the world (Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, Israel, 
Namibia, South Africa, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Romania, Russia, 
Taiwan, US) analysed the use of foreign precedents in constitutional cases, and besides the 
usual qualitative analysis also a quantitative one has been done and presented for each of 
them (the ECJ and the ECtHR were not analysed). With this volume, we now fi nally have 
data about the actual number of cases in which foreign case law was cited (also in 
comparison to the total number of cases in that country), the total number of citations (and 
the numbers according to the cited jurisdictions), the number of citations in cases dealing 
with human rights and in cases dealing with institutional issues, the number of citations in 
majority and minority opinions. Several tables and graphs help in understanding the 
numbers.
The main results of the volume are the following (pp. 429–430): 
(1) Arguments from comparative law are only used as an additional argument in 
support of the previously developed position. This confi rms to the usual recommendation 
about how such arguments should be used. They do not have any binding force,2 and it is 
1 For recent general overviews of the literature see Halmai, G.: The Use of Foreign Law in 
Constitutional Interpretation, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 1328–
1348 (Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó eds, 2012); Saunders, Ch.: Judicial Engagement with 
Comparative Law, in Comparative Constitutional Law 571–598 (Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon 
eds, 2011).
2  This is called ‘soft use’ by Taavi Annus: Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and 
Strategy of Selecting the Right Argument, 14 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 
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not prescribed by positive law to use such arguments – except for South Africa and Malawi. 
It is well-known that Section 35.1 of the South African Interim Constitution, as well as 
Section 39.1 of the now valid Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, explicitly 
encourage the study of foreign cases in constitutional review. But it is probably less well-
known that also the s. 11.2 of the 1994 Constitution of Malawi does the same: “In 
interpreting the provisions of this Constitution, a court of law shall ... where applicable, 
have regard to current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case law.” 
(2) Courts do not explain or justify the case selection, they are just cherry-picking. The 
usual trick is choosing only those countries that apply the same solutions as we prefer. 
(3) Arguments from comparative law are rather used in human rights cases than in 
institutional ones. This is due to the internationalised (or even universal) human rights 
discourse which is less bound to the national traditions. 
(4) Citations are more likely to occur in new and complex cases, or in cases which 
have a potentially important social or political impact. The explicit reference to foreign case 
law might be especially relevant for new constitutional courts of transitional countries 
which try to show themselves in a prestigious society of well-established foreign 
constitutional or supreme courts in order to collect more credibility in their respective 
domestic discourses. 
(5) The number of citations is directly related to the level of disagreement (the more 
dissenting opinions we have, the more likely it is to have an argument from comparative 
law). They are used in order to give the impression that a decision was arrived at after 
careful consideration. 
(6) The South African Supreme Court, the US Supreme Court, the ECtHR (and the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, even though it is not mentioned in the fi nal 
conclusions, but it comes up in many country reports) are the most infl uential “foreign” 
constitutional courts in the world.
Usually we read in books that were written on arguments from comparative law that 
such arguments are becoming more and more frequent in courts all around the world (this is 
often supposed to legitimise why someone writes a book on the issue). The main causes of 
the trend are said to be: The general trend of globalization, and, as a consequence, the 
overall weakening of national isolation; the emergence of inter- or supranational courts as 
meeting points of different legal cultures, where the practice of legal comparison spreads 
the culture of comparative law; and the similar role-perception of judges (i.e. that of 
guarding the basic values of constitutionalism which are considered as being some kind of 
modern or postmodern natural law or as a modern ius gentium)3 in liberal democracies. 
This common identity then serves as the ground for a feeling of global community, which 
in turn leads to a dialogue,4 which manifests itself in references made in decisions to each 
301 (2004). According to an even more radical description, such references have a merely ‘ornamental 
function.’ See Drobnig, U.: The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in The Use of Comparative Law 
by Courts 3, 18. (Ulrich Drobnig and Sjef van Erp eds, 1999).
3 See Halmai, G.: The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 1331–32 (Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó eds, 
2012).
4 For a discussion on the dialogue model of this phenomenon, see Choudhry. S.: Globalization 
in Search of Justifi cation: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Indiana 
Law Journal 819, 855–65 (1999); Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and 
Supranational Experiences (Filippo Fontanelli et al. eds, 2010).
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other’s works.5 Groppi and Ponthereau deny the existence of this trend (p. 430), and most 
of the country reports do support this brave (but somewhat sad) thesis with data. Their 
explanation is that international courts (ECtHR and IACHR) take over this role (in the 
terminology of the volume, international courts are not “foreign”, if there is an international 
obligation to follow their decisions). 
Whet her one goes for arguments from foreign law or not, often also depends on 
whether one has suffi cient time and knowledge of the relevant languages. The editors’ 
“suspicion is that this practice of citation more than contributing to the enhancement of 
‘legal cosmopolitanism’, actually promotes the creation of a ‘closed circle’, from which 
most of the non-English speaking countries are left outside in the cold” (p. 429). This 
linguistic barrier might be the reason why the ECtHR is world-wide much more cited than 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, even though the latter one does have a doctrine of 
fundamental rights which is at certain parts more sophisticated than the one of the ECtHR. 
To a good part for linguistic reasons, the ECtHR seems to have the role of disseminating 
European constitutional culture all around the world.
The volume of Groppi and Ponthoreau is a methodologically well-designed project 
where all relevant questions have been asked and empirically tested (sometimes also such 
questions were asked which seem to be less relevant, like whether citations are in footnotes 
or in the main text of a judgment, or whether the citation is in the majority or in the 
dissenting opinion instead of just asking whether there were any dissenting opinions in the 
judgment). The individual chapters are also well-written, thorough and with the help of the 
graphs also easily understandable. This piece hopefully shows an empirical turn in legal 
scholarship: we much too often talked about trends without actually checking them 
empirically.6 Groppi and Ponthereau are convincingly showing that legal scholarship can 
and should develop in its methods, methods informed by social sciences are not simply for 
legal sociologists, but such data can also inform hard core doctrinal debates.
5 For a discussion on this phenomenon as part of the international communication between 
courts, see Slaughter, A.-M.: A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 University of Richmond 
Law Review 99, 129–32 (1994).
6 For a further nice exception see Elkins, Z.–Ginsburg, T.–Melton, J.: The Endurance of 
National Constitutions (2009). For a project with similar ambitions see http://www.conreasonproject.
com/.
